Good afternoon, or good evening, or good morning to you, the listeners, wherever you’re listening from—whichever applies. In today’s episode, we’ll be talking to a friend of the show, someone who really is interested in the African–China trade—or maybe I should even say the Nigerian–China trade, more specifically.

Today’s guest is an academic. But maybe I shouldn’t say that she is an academic. She is—it’s just that she does her work in such fun ways while discussing very serious issues. This person is known to us as Dr. Jing Jing Liu, whose research examines African–China engagement through the lives of everyday Nigerian and Chinese traders—mainly in China, but sometimes in Nigeria. She recently published a very fun paper that we hope to engage with over the course of this episode.

In my usual manner, I’ll leave her to introduce herself properly, because I don’t think I can do a better job than she can. So yes, Jing Jing, would you do us the honors?

Yeah, that’s a great question. I always appreciate questions that ask how I got interested in this. I’d say there are two formative moments. The first was when I was in Yiwu, China, accompanying Nigerian traders—mostly Igbo traders—in the markets. Sometimes I acted as a translator, sometimes just as a companion or researcher. They would frequently talk about exchange rates: naira to USD, naira to RMB, RMB to USD. And they’d say these numbers so quickly, in this dizzying fashion—I could never keep up. It was such an astounding experience.

All the traders I talked to were like this. I’d go home and try to write down the numbers they told me, and I couldn’t make sense of them. It seemed to be a kind of mental habit among the traders I was working with. Eventually, I began to understand more: what the exchange rate was, why it was important. This was in the summer of 2016, when the exchange rate had just changed dramatically—it had doubled from about 150 to over 300. So it was a moment of major upheaval, and that’s why there was such a panic. Exchange rates were suddenly everywhere in the conversation.

I watched people bring wads of US dollars to individuals parked outside hotels, exchanging them for RMB so they could go to the market and pay for goods. It struck me how complicated this process was—more difficult than it needed to be. As I learned more and engaged more deeply, I realized that people were trying to facilitate direct currency exchange. There were intermediaries and agents in both Nigeria and China who held both naira and RMB accounts. They were doing trade—export—but also acting as currency brokers.

That was my first real encounter with the importance of money—not just money itself, but currency—and I realized this was something that wasn’t often discussed in the Africa–China literature. Those discussions are usually very high level. No one talks about currency pairings. For Nigerians, the trade often works through the US dollar. If you’re coming from a francophone country, you’re working through the euro, and so on. I found that compelling.

The second moment—one I talk about in my paper’s introduction—was more recent, in June 2023. It brought everything full circle. I was in Lagos, doing fieldwork, and like any academic, I’d proposed a budget. My university or a funding body had given me a set amount of money, and I thought it would carry me through the research period.

Then I got to Lagos. It was a new government. They’d just announced the removal of long-standing fuel subsidies and were going to unify the exchange rates. Suddenly, chaos. Hiring a driver, taking a taxi—everything doubled in price overnight. The money I brought wasn’t enough. I was stuck. I didn’t have a Nigerian bank account, and I was trying to figure out how to move money from my Canadian account to someone in Nigeria.

I reached out to a friend, a trader I’d met in China, whom I was staying with. I asked if I could transfer US dollars or Canadian dollars into his account. I assumed he must have a US domiciliary account—a DOM account. He laughed and said, “Why would I have that? I haven’t had a DOM account in eight years. I closed it when Buhari became president.” That shocked me. This is someone who runs a big shop at Trade Fair—he’s a major player. And yet he doesn’t transact in US dollars? That moment sent me down a path—trying to understand how people actually manage trade and money exchange without relying on the US dollar. That’s what led to my thinking around de-dollarization.

De-dollarization includes, of course, government efforts—things like currency swaps, or the digital currencies issued by Nigeria and China. But it also includes the everyday transactions. I wanted to show that it’s not just a binary: dollar versus renminbi, or US hegemony versus RMB internationalization. What I see developing among Nigerians is a kind of multicurrency fluency. And if you live in Nigeria, you kind of have to adopt this fluency. You deal with dollars, you deal with RMB, you deal with cryptocurrency—because you have to. It’s not a political statement, like, “I won’t use the dollar anymore.” That’s not the attitude. And it wouldn’t help to say, “From now on I’ll only use RMB.” That doesn’t make sense, because you have account closures, government crackdowns—things shift constantly. So people have to be savvy. They use whatever resources are available. That’s the reality.

That brings me to my next question—especially since you were talking about de-dollarization, which is where you left off. When I was reading through your paper—well, I haven’t done a deep dive yet, but just scanning through—I noticed that in your introduction, you ask: “If the USD is the de facto currency of international trade, how are Igbo Nigerian traders—mostly of Igbo extraction—importing Chinese goods without it?”

Even though your focus is more on the how, I’m also interested in the why. That’s basically my question. And I’m hoping that, again for the benefit of our listeners, you can speak to that—if it makes sense to you?

You mean in terms of why the RMB is being used to facilitate importation?

Yes. So why the RMB? And why digital currencies, as opposed to the US dollar, in this move toward de-dollarization? Not just why, but also how—how it’s being used, especially in places like Alaba International Market and Trade Fair, which you mentioned. And—this is something I’ve asked you privately—do you have a sense of whether RMB is also being used in really big international markets, like Onitsha Main Market?

Sure. I think the “why,” as anyone in Nigeria probably knows from experience—and certainly during the month and a half I was there—is that exchanging money can be incredibly difficult. There’s often a shortage of dollars. If you need to make a large transaction and go to the bank, they might only give you a fraction of what you actually need. That makes completing your trade—settling your suppliers—very difficult.

There’s also the volatility in the exchange rate between the US dollar and the naira, which causes huge headaches for traders. And that’s before you even consider the differences between the official rate and the unofficial rate, which—at least before the recent rate unification—could be significant.

So I’d say that’s a big part of the “why.” It’s just difficult to get the money you need, in the amount you need, at the time you need it. And there’s very little urgency shown to small-time traders who are just trying to keep their businesses afloat. Also, for traders who are just starting out, opening a domiciliary account isn’t the first step. It comes with fees they might not want to pay, and even then, actually securing the amount of money they need can still be a problem.

Now, regarding the RMB: Again, this isn’t de-dollarization in the sense of a full rejection of the dollar. One of the reasons why the Naira–RMB exchange might be more stable than the Naira–USD is because the RMB is, more or less, pegged to the dollar. That peg depends on China’s own capital controls and its ability to manage its currency. But it creates a kind of indirect stability that makes RMB trade a bit more desirable for Nigerian traders.

Then there’s another level of stability through USDT—Tether—and other stablecoins that are also pegged to the US dollar. Using those gives traders more predictability and speed. There’s no cap on how much stablecoin you can buy in a day or even in an hour. You just need to find the right sources—whether through exchanges (like Binance, which used to operate in Nigeria), or over-the-counter (OTC) suppliers, or friends and family members who are doing peer-to-peer exchanges. Some of these folks even do a bit of arbitrage—buying and selling crypto and stablecoins, and making small commissions on top. So it’s not just about formal financial systems; it’s also about networks of trust, convenience, and speed.

Yeah, actually, if I could jump in there—because that really connects to the direction I was going. You pointed out that we can’t exactly call this “de-dollarization” in a strict sense. But it does seem like we’re witnessing an evolution in the nature of US dollar hegemony. You don’t seem to join the camp of those who either celebrate or mourn the supposed end of dollar dominance. But it’s clear that we’re in a slightly more multipolar moment—both geopolitically and in terms of the currencies people are relying on. In the paper, you briefly trace the trajectory of the US dollar’s role in global trade. I wonder if you could summarize that for us. Things didn’t always seem this complicated in terms of which currencies were involved in international trade. So maybe you could give us a bit of a history—just briefly—and also speak to whether you think US dollar hegemony is actually being challenged today.

That’s a great question, and I want to start with the present. Because what’s happening geopolitically right now supports the thesis of multipolarity, and of de-dollarization—not in a strict sense, as you said, but in a meaningful one. There’s less confidence in US Treasury markets, less confidence in the dollar, and in the broader system of US monetary hegemony. Interestingly, you now have people pining for that era of dollar dominance—because what’s replacing it is a kind of insular US posture, one the country is actively choosing as part of its political direction.

That opens up an interesting space. Some people are saying this is the perfect moment for the RMB to become more internationalized, maybe even take on that hegemonic role. Others are saying the euro could rise to the occasion. But in both cases, I don’t think there’s much appetite for these currencies—or for the institutions behind them—to step into that hegemonic space. That’s what’s fascinating. A year ago, or even a few months ago, this was hypothetical: “What if the US loses its monetary dominance?” Now we’re in a “what now?” moment. And what we’re seeing is that neither the EU nor China actually wants to become that kind of player.

What China seems to be doing instead is emphasizing bilateralization rather than internationalization. That’s been their approach all along—making individual currency swap arrangements with other countries. They love their currency swaps. And this is partly in response to the restrictions the US can impose on dollar-denominated transactions. That’s a major vulnerability for countries trying to avoid the geopolitical risks of relying on the dollar. So we’re now seeing what happens when the “what if” becomes a lived reality. And that’s going to be very interesting to watch in the coming months—or even weeks.

Yeah. It’s like we’ve shifted from a yearly to a minute-by-minute timescale.

Exactly! And it’s such an interesting moment to be living in. I’ll come back to your question about the history of dollar hegemony, but I want to mention something else first—because it was one of those moments where something you wrote in a paper suddenly happens in real life. In the paper, I mention that China and Nigeria are the only two populous countries with a blockchain-enabled digital currency. There are some smaller countries with them too—like the Bahamas with the SandDollar—but not on the same scale.

Then, just a couple of weeks ago, I came across news from a group called the Nigeria–China Strategic Partnership. They claim that Nigeria will soon sign a deal on a digital RMB with China to enable direct conversion from naira to Chinese currency. Interesting, right? This group says they’ve secured over $30 billion in investment commitments and expressions of interest. And in private conversations with people closer to the government—and to money—I’ve heard there’s real interest in creating greater convertibility between the naira and RMB. The thinking is: This trade is already happening. There are hundreds of thousands of Nigerians going to China, and Chinese traders coming to Nigeria, all the time. So why not make it easier with a direct, bilateral conversion? And only two countries that already have this kind of digital infrastructure could realistically start implementing those kinds of policies—digital bilateral swaps.

Quite an interesting development. I want to come back to that later—we’re going to ask you to look into the crystal ball for our last question and reflect on the future. But before we get there, let’s return to the past a bit. You’ve already pointed to how things are shifting now, but what would you mark as some of the major turning points—before this current moment—that helped occasion this shift in US dollar hegemony toward what we might call a moment of currency multipolarity? I’m thinking especially of the Trump administration’s policies and other events that may have accelerated the change.

Yeah, I think that’s a great question. One key turning point was US sanctions—sanctions against Russia, against Iran. These were a wake-up call to the rest of the world about how easily the dollar can be weaponized against those who rely on it.

Because the dollar accounts for the majority of international transactions, being cut off from it is a big deal. If you’re sanctioned and can no longer use dollar-denominated channels to process payments, it can completely freeze your economy. That pushed countries like Russia and China to begin building their own alternatives—payment and settlement systems outside of SWIFT, outside of dollar-clearing networks. Then there’s the rise of decentralized cryptocurrency, which introduced the idea that you could bypass all government oversight if you moved money through these alternative paths. That’s been particularly important for countries with strict capital controls—like China—which want to know how much money is leaving, how it’s leaving, and where it’s going.

That desire for control is also why they’ve created their own digital currencies. It lets them retain oversight in a parallel way. And no policy, so far, has been able to keep pace with the development and use of cryptocurrencies. I don’t want to romanticize crypto. It’s not just being used for remittances or payments that do good in the world. There are environmental consequences. It’s used for financial fraud, illicit trade—all of that.

One or two scams have emerged, yeah.

Just one or two! People had too much time during COVID. Everyone found some coin to jump into. But seriously, all of that—plus the emergence of new regional blocs and trade partnerships—is reshaping the monetary landscape. You asked me to predict the future. I think we’ll see more digital forms of these currency swaps, and more regional consortiums for settlements—whether it’s BRICS, Belt and Road countries, or other regional groups.

For Southeast Asia, why not trade in yuan? For Nigeria and China—major trade partners—why not sign bilateral agreements? And China, while it’s probably the most prolific user of currency swap agreements, isn’t alone. These arrangements are appealing for lots of reasons. They don’t look like a frontal attack on the dollar. It’s more of an oblique move. “We’re just doing this as well.” And the outcome may be de-dollarization, even if that’s not explicitly the goal.

We’re already seeing greater diversity in reserve currencies. Even the Canadian dollar is being introduced as a reserve currency. The RMB too. The US dollar still dominates, but its share of global reserves has fallen from around 70–80 percent to about 60 percent. So there’s a slow move away from the dollar—but not a dramatic rupture. Nobody wants to create a huge disruption in the system. Tariffs, for example, are already a major shock. And every economy wants to maintain order, not instability.

That’s why, historically, the Bretton Woods Agreement was introduced in 1944. It was a response to shocks—to currency instability, to global disorder. The international community declared the US dollar the reserve currency, backed by gold. That worked until 1971, when the gold standard was dropped and the dollar became a floating currency. That’s when it arguably gained a second, more expansive form of hegemony.

I mention this in the paper, but China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a report in 2023 titled US Hegemony and Its Perils. It outlines the many dimensions of US dominance—not just the dollar, but military power, technological supremacy, cultural influence. All of these support dollar hegemony, and all of them are being questioned now. We’re seeing new alliances form or reawaken. From where I’m based in Canada, for example, there’s been a noticeable uptick in engagement with the EU and with Mexico—conversations that bypass the US. As the US retreats in some areas, it leaves a vacuum. And in that space, countries are realizing they have to form new partnerships, new agreements—conversations they maybe hadn’t had before because the US was always present, always involved. Now they have to make new friends, in a way.

Yeah—and you have to have different currencies in your basket. It’s almost like the multicurrency fluency of Igbo traders is something nation-states are now having to catch up with.

Completely. Yeah.

On that point about the formal, official dimension of things, I want to shift to the Nigerian element of this. You note that Nigeria announced a currency swap agreement in 2018, pledging to denominate a larger share of its foreign reserves in RMB. That agreement was renewed in 2021. But you also suggest that the policy hasn’t quite met its objectives. It’s fallen short of its aspirations. And you cite commentators like human rights lawyer Femi Falana—one of Emeka’s favorite people—who argue that the World Bank and IMF are colluding with the Nigerian Central Bank to frustrate the policy. That raises two questions for me. First, to what extent has the RMB swap actually been implemented in Nigeria? And second, how seriously do you take this idea of collusion—or, more broadly, the suggestion that international financial institutions aligned with the US are actively frustrating these types of swaps in Nigeria or elsewhere?

Great question. Honestly, I don’t even think collusion is necessary—the system is already set up to frustrate those efforts. There’s no need to conspire. The structure itself does the work. Even if you secure RMB through a swap line, you still have to pay other fees in US dollars. And then there are the contradictions. Around the same time Nigeria was signing this swap deal, China was also implementing policies that encouraged its exporters to invoice in dollars—to bring more US dollars into China, because of declining foreign investment and reserves.

So on the one hand, there’s a swap agreement with Nigeria. On the other hand, there are incentives inside China—like tax rebates—for exporters to stick with the dollar. My friend’s wife, who’s Chinese, was grappling with this. They had always invoiced in RMB, with direct RMB–naira transactions. They had accounts on both sides and were moving into money exchange because they had the capital to do so. But suddenly there was this extra incentive to switch to the dollar—an incentive that directly contradicted the purpose of the swap.

That’s why I don’t think there’s a deliberate campaign to undermine the policy. The contradictions are already embedded in the system. And on the Nigerian side, just think about how hard it is for many people to access dollars through their banks. The same problems apply to accessing RMB. So in terms of implementation, I’d say the swap exists more on paper than in practice for many traders. If you have clout or influence, maybe it’s easier. But if you’re just starting out—or even if you’re established but moving $10,000 to $20,000 in volume—you’ll still run into difficulties. I did read that the swap was renewed again in December 2024, just a few months ago. Given current conditions, maybe there’ll be improvements in how it’s implemented.

That’s interesting. So the frustrations are already baked into the system—bureaucratic, logistical, financial. Even accessing any currency at official rates is difficult. That’s a fair point. One our esteemed friend of the show Mr. Falana might need to consider too.

But you’ve already started to lean into where we wanted to go next—maybe our penultimate question—which is about the future. You’ve mentioned the BRICS currency idea, and the rise of central bank digital currencies. So I suppose the overarching question is: What do you think is the future of de-dollarization? I’m curious how you see it playing out both at the official level—among governments and institutions—and also at the level of everyday citizens and traders. I know it’s a fast-changing landscape, so we won’t hold you to your predictions or make you pay a penalty if they don’t come true. But what trends do you see pointing toward the future of de-dollarization? Might governments eventually formalize some of the informal practices you’ve described in the Nigeria–China context?

Yes—well, big questions you’re asking here. If I’m right, please replay what I said. If I’m wrong…

We’ll cut it out here.

So, I’ve written about RMB internationalization, but honestly, looking at what’s been happening—how no one has rushed forward to take up the mantle of the next hegemonic currency—I think what we’ll see in the next few years is more bilateral agreements and regional arrangements. And I think that is the direction of de-dollarization.

Not one country taking over—willingly or unwillingly—but a process that emerges from the accumulation of these smaller arrangements: BRICS currencies, currency swaps, regional trade agreements. Even though I’ve said Nigeria and China are the only populous countries with digital currencies in place right now, most countries are developing their own. Once more of those systems are up and running, swaps will be easier, bilateralism will expand.

And as more people gain the kind of multicurrency fluency that I talk about—similar to what Igbo traders developed out of necessity—I think that will become part of the new world order. It won’t just be traders citing dollar–RMB or naira–RMB rates; we’ll all have a greater familiarity with the value of our currencies on an international stage.

As an anthropologist, I tend to stay in the middle of these debates. But on the question of whether informal channels will be made formal—I don’t think so, not entirely. Informal systems rely on the formal, and vice versa. It’s not an either-or. Why are naira–RMB trades a little more stable? Because of China’s capital controls and the RMB’s peg to the US dollar. Or take stablecoins—they’re pegged to the dollar too. So traders are constantly navigating formal systems, leveraging their constraints for practical ends. These informal practices—like peer-to-peer crypto exchanges or under-the-table currency swaps—aren’t going to be formalized in a neat way. They’ll continue to piggyback on official infrastructure. It’s always going to be about workarounds, and also about working within the system, linking the informal and the formal.

Right. Excellent. So if de-dollarization is going to happen—or continue—it’s more like death by a thousand cuts, including some self-inflicted ones, rather than a sudden overnight collapse.

Exactly. I think that’s a great analogy. For decades now, economists and political scientists have been asking: What’s the next apex currency? Who’s going to replace the dollar? They’ve always put forward one country or another. But that’s not what’s happened. So clearly something in the model has to change. And I think we are seeing those changes now—but not in the form of one currency replacing another. We’re moving toward a more diversified basket.

That makes sense.

Well, that’s really a lot to take in

—especially if you’re trying to take it in for investment advice.

Exactly. I’m here listening to all of this, and thinking of my trader brothers. You know where my allegiance lies.

No, I don’t know where your allegiance lies.

I’ll tell you. Don’t worry.

Yeah—Jing Jing mentioned those traders moving $10,000, $20,000—maybe $100,000. Maybe it’s just one container here and there, not in bales, but small-volume importers going to China. I’m thinking about what this imagined future might mean for them. I’m familiar with the kinds of documentation required for those trades. There’s the guy who opens a Form M at the start of the year with millions of dollars, and then there’s the guy moving $10K, $20K, $30K, trying to hustle something through.

So two things. First, building on what Jing Jing said about workarounds and working between systems: What would it mean if, instead of having to go through the central bank and open documentation for trade that you maybe only need to do intermittently, you could just access something simpler? And second—maybe unrelated—but what about the dichotomy of currencies within China itself? The RMB, and then the yuan? What role does that play in all of this? How does it relate to capital controls? And how might it shape the future of trade facilitation?

It’s hard to speak outside of the current moment—especially given the implementation of pretty substantial tariffs on China. China’s going to have to reroute its products. And on the point about visas: Yes, that’s definitely an issue.

But maybe now, with a surplus of goods and manufacturing slowing down—especially in places like Yiwu, which is a central manufacturing hub—it will become easier to get visas. Maybe they’ll be encouraging people to come, to stimulate exports to new partners. That’s the only way forward: You need other countries to absorb your goods.

Manufacturing still remains a critical component of the Chinese economy. They’ve built extensive logistics networks that work to facilitate this. I was just listening to a podcast about how, in the last few years, due to rising labor costs, some factories started moving production to Vietnam and Cambodia. But now many are moving back—because manufacturing has become more technologically advanced and less labor intensive. Labor costs are going down, but not because of wages—because fewer people are needed. And none of those other countries can match the scale or efficiency of China’s logistics infrastructure.

So manufacturing is staying, and the government wants to maintain productivity—because that’s part of its promise to its citizens, its national development strategy. But to do that, it needs recipients for those goods. So I think you’ll see more goods entering markets like Nigeria. Whether that’s good or bad is a broader conversation. But trade will likely increase.

The Chinese government always finds ways to get those goods to their final destinations. That could mean cheaper shipping, or loosening visa restrictions to allow more buyers in. There’s always a way to open the tap. And just as easily, a way to close it. But I think we’re in a moment of opening.

That’s interesting. This has been such a rich conversation—you’ve challenged a lot of our preconceived ideas, some of our heroes as well. And you’ve done the difficult work of trying to sketch how things might unfold. We’re really grateful for the time and thought you’ve brought to this.

Now, I know we said that was the final question, but here’s one last, final-final one: What’s next for your research? Will you be pursuing more projects like this?

Thanks for that. Yes—I’m currently working on another paper, still connected to this theme, but focused on cryptocurrency. The argument is somewhat similar, but this time from the perspective of everyday Nigerians—not traders, but regular citizens.

I’m developing this idea that cryptocurrency is acting as a kind of temporal custodian for people—a way of safeguarding the future. It’s about denominating savings in crypto as a hedge, a way of resisting economic erosion.

I’m trying to link this to the political project of maintaining the middle class. There’s a fear that worsening economic conditions—the loss of income, purchasing power, educational opportunity—amounts to an assault on the middle class. And the middle class has historically played a role in challenging government policy, in sustaining some semblance of democracy.

So if people can’t maintain that class identity, can’t reproduce those conditions of life, then we’re witnessing a deeper erosion. For some, crypto becomes a way to preserve that collectivity. It’s not always a direct, instrumental calculation—it’s abstract, even ideological. But there’s a belief that if you keep your savings in naira, the government can always reach it. That idea really took off around the #EndSARS protests, though it was present before.

People saw how Bitcoin allowed them to bypass government regulation, and that shaped how they understood its potential. That’s what I’m exploring in this new paper.

I’m also working on another project, this one on Nigerian migration—particularly student migration. I’ve been looking at students going not just to China but more so to Canada. And recently, Canada has slashed its immigration quotas, which will massively impact Nigeria’s education industry. Most students were initially going to the UK, but then policy changes there pushed them toward Canada. Now the US and Canada are both becoming less open. So we’re seeing new migration patterns—and that’s another area I’m tracking closely.

Fascinating. We’d love to have you back on the show to talk more about that. It’s all incredibly relevant to the kinds of themes we’re interested in and to global developments more broadly.

I’d love that. It also gives me motivation to finish the work!

I hear that. Motivation is always needed—I can relate. Thanks again for joining us. We really appreciate your insights, and we look forward to continuing the conversation.

Thank you for having me. I really enjoy your podcast—so thank you.

And sorry for dragging you up for this.

It’s all good! And for listeners, I’m always up at 6 a.m., no problem. I’ve already run a mile and started my day.

Wow, okay—if you’re serious, that’s impressive.

No, I’m not–– I was just trying to impress your listeners.

I’m sure our listeners are already impressed. If you’re bold enough to send us your digital wallet address, we’ll see what we can do about compensating for the time you spent with us.

Haha. No worries at all. Thank you again!

Take care.

You too. Bye!